Conflict Alerts # 662, 22 August 2024
Ayan Datta In the news
On 19 August, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, told the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, that he would send Mossad Chief David Barnea, Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar, and Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Major General Nitzan Alon to Cairo for negotiations with Hamas. Additionally, Israel accepted Blinken’s “bridging proposal” for a ceasefire and hostage exchange, and the US urged Hamas to do the same.
On 18 August, Blinken arrived in Tel Aviv to advance the Israel-Hamas negotiations, marking his ninth visit to Israel since the war began. Blinken stated: “This is a decisive moment, probably the best, maybe the last, opportunity to get the hostages home, to get a cease-fire.”
The same day, Hamas leaked the terms of Blinken’s proposal, which included the following: the IDF would declare a temporary ceasefire and reduce its presence at the Philadelphi Corridor, the Palestinian Authority (PA) would govern the Rafah crossing under Israel’s supervision, the IDF would control the Netzarim Corridor and screen Palestinians passing through it, and Israel have the right to veto the release of 100 Palestinian prisoners demanded by Hamas. Furthermore, Israel would deport multiple Palestinian prisoners, and its military would be allowed to resume operations against Hamas if the group were to refuse its demands.
On the same day, Hamas rejected Blinken’s proposal for being biased towards Israel. The armed group reiterated its demand for a permanent ceasefire and stated: “We are not facing a deal or real negotiations, but…American diktats.” Hamas added that negotiations should implement the armed group’s 2 July proposal, based on US President Joe Biden’s three-stage plan, instead of discussing new proposals.
On 17 August, the US, Qatar and Egypt announced a “bridging proposal” to Israel and Hamas, which was “consistent with the principles laid out by Biden on May 31, 2024. On the same day, Hamas stated that there was no progress on ceasefire-hostage negotiations and accused the US of creating a “false positive atmosphere.”
Issues at large
First, the US objectives in the Gaza war. According to The Times of Israel and Al Jazeera, Washington aims to secure a hostage deal and permanent ceasefire, support Israel’s right to self-defence and its goal of destroying Hamas but with lower civilian casualties, deter Iran and its proxies from escalating the conflict, and establish a two-state solution with Gaza under the PA’s control.
Second, the US’ strategies. Since 7 October, Washington has pledged “ironclad support” for Israel through diplomatic support and weapons shipments and used its regional presence to counter Iran and its proxies. The US has kept negotiations alive by engaging regional partners, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and the PA, proposing a ceasefire-hostage exchange plan and facilitating aid delivery in Gaza through international platforms and the Gaza Aid pier. According to the Economist, Blinken has played a crucial role in the US diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire. Previously, he visited Israel five times between October and November 2023, leading to a 7-day pause. In 2024, he visited Israel nine times to reach a new ceasefire agreement.
Third, limitations of the US. According to the Times of Israel, the US’ aims of securing a permanent ceasefire and support for the elimination of Hamas are contradictory because the permanent ceasefire would lead to Hamas’ revival as a governing force. Furthermore, Israeli leaders have consistently rejected a two-state solution and PA rule over Gaza, instead supporting the IDF’s “overriding security control” over the enclave. Additionally, the Institute for National Security Studies reported that Hamas' immense popularity in Gaza, massive tunnel network, and weapons stockpiles complicate any endgame involving the group’s destruction and rule of any other group over the enclave.
In perspective
Blinken’s visits to Israel mark a revival of the “shuttle diplomacy” approach to the Middle East conflicts, popularised by Henry Kissinger during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973-74. Blinken rarely met Israeli leaders in isolation, with his visits usually followed and preceded by trips to Arab states. However, unlike Kissinger, who successfully extracted concessions from Israel, Blinken provided unconditional support, limiting US leverage over Netanyahu. His bridging proposal reflects Israel’s desire to recreate the pre-2005 political arrangement in Gaza, with a weak PA in charge and IDF enjoying a substantial presence, completely alienating Hamas in the process. As long as the US carte blanche to Israel continues, its efforts to resolve the conflict are unlikely to succeed.