Conflict Alerts # 671, 19 September 2024
In the news
On 18 September, the Biden administration stated that it required more information from Ukraine to approve the usage of long-range weapons in Russia. According to the administration, relaxing the restriction might not have a large effect on the ground but trigger “great risk.” The US has allowed Ukraine to use its weapons in a limited manner for cross-border and counter-attacks. However, it has been under pressure from NATO members to let Ukraine decide on the extent of usage of the West-supplied weapons.
On 14 September, Chair of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer said: “Every nation that is attacked has the right to defend itself. And that right doesn’t stop at the border of your own nation.” Chief of the Czech Armed Forces General Staff, Lieutenant General Karel ?ehka said: “We believe that the Ukrainians should decide themselves how to use it… It's important to take into consideration every aspect, including the potential of escalation and other things.”
On 12 September, after a month of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk, President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed reports about the Kursk. He said: "Everything is going according to our Ukrainian plan." Despite the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk, Russian forces continued to make gains in eastern Ukraine.
On the same day, Russia's Defense Ministry claimed to have captured nearly 63 square kilometres from Ukrainian forces. It claimed to have launched the counteroffensive on 10 September and the recaptured settlements including, Apanasovka, Byakhovo, Vishnevka, Viktorovka, Vnezapnoye, Gordeyevka, Krasnooktyabrskoye, Obukhovka, Snagost, and 10-y Oktyabr. A spokesperson close to the Russian military said: “The Ukrainians have also stopped bringing in new reserves . . . they’ve started to move around less and to dig in more instead.”
On the same day, Pentagon spokesperson Major General Pat Ryder called Russia’s gains to be "marginal."
Issues at large
First, Russia’s counteroffensive. Russian counterattack aimed to "open a land route" from Glushkovo to Korenevo (districts in Kursk) to deter the impact on bridges from Ukrainian strikes. This comes as the south of Kursk functions as a logistics point for Russia to resupply and was forced to install temporary bridges to prevent damage from strikes. Once the counteroffensive was launched in the Ukraine-held districts, the protection was ensured and Russia was able to stop Ukraine forces furthering towards Lgov, another town in Kursk located 80 kilometres west across the Seym river. According to the latest assessment of The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces could aim for a temporary split in the Kursk Oblast to form tactical positions ahead of a coordinated operation. Since Russia is yet to gather enough resources for a full-scale attack, the operation seems weak, with a tactical goal to push the Ukrainian forces further east.
Second, Ukraine’s response. Ukraine’s objective in the Kursk incursion was to divert Russian forces from the eastern Ukrainian Donbas front. However, until now it has been unsuccessful as Russia advances in Pokrovsk city in Donetsk Oblast and other districts in the north and east of Ukraine. Earlier in September, Zelensky claimed Russia withdrew 60,000 troops to redeploy in Kursk. However, there have been no clear reports on how many Russian troops, air brigades and marine brigades are operating in the counteroffensive. According to military analysts, despite redeployment, Russia is observed to have needed resources to sustain the operation in Kursk and Donetsk Oblasts. Whereas, Ukraine’s difficulty in countering Russia in the east (Vuhledar and Pokrovsk towns) remains.
Third, the West debate over war escalation. When the debate first began on using West-supplied weapon systems in Russia, neither the US nor Europe provided clear approval. The US continued to maintain an ambiguous stance while NATO and European allies supported Ukraine in using the weapons in defence. This was mainly aimed at preventing the missile and drone targets coming from Russia. Since the Kursk incursion and multiple missiles launched far inside Russia, Ukraine’s demand for permission from the US to use long-range weapons in Russia began and was supported by the NATO allies. However, the US fears an escalation of war. Long-range missiles include the British-led Storm Shadow and the similar French-made SCALP or the US-made Army Tactical Missile System, ATACMS and ongoing Ukraine’s production to develop its long-range weapons. These are already in use, targeting the military hubs and Russian infrastructure in occupied areas. However, the military officials in the US observe that allowing Ukraine to use them inside Russia will not make a difference.
In perspective
A gradual escalation of the war. To see if this incursion could be an escalation point or not, it is necessary to look back at previous battles and the counteroffensive history of Ukraine and Russia. When Ukraine lost its spring offensive and the battles of Bakhmut and Aviidivka, it convinced the West to increase its air defence system support to counter Russia’s air strikes. Similarly, Ukraine is attempting to showcase its capability to launch an operation in Kursk and strike further into Russia to pursue long-range weapons to par with Russia’s aerial power. The West could follow the pursuit but to ensure the war does not expand outside Ukraine.
Second, Russia’s long wait game. Russia’s response to the Kursk incursion was initially viewed as undefended and slow but compared to Ukraine’s response to its eastern offensive, it has been quick to launch a counteroffensive in Kursk. As per the observations, the redeployed Russian units are not massive but it does not want Ukrainian forces furthering. The major objective remains to be capturing the Donbas region and it has managed to progress its eastern offensive despite the Kursk diversion.