Conflict Alerts # 686, 19 December 2024
In the news
On 17 December, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Syria’s interim Salvation Government leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known by his alias Mohammed Abu Al-Jolani) stated that all other armed groups in Syria would be “disbanded and the fighters trained to join the ranks of the defence ministry…All will be subject to the law… Syria must remain united.” Previously, on 14 December, HTS took control of southern Syria’s Daraa City and the Nassib border crossing from the Southern Operations Room, a Sunni armed group, with the latter agreeing to cooperate with the HTS.
On 16 December, Syria’s former President Bashar al-Assad gave his first public remarks since his ouster. He refuted prevailing beliefs that Assad had planned his exit from Syria, stressing that he stayed in the country until the “early hours of Sunday, December 8, 2024.” Assad allegedly oversaw the Syria Arab Army’s (SAA) operations from Russia’s military base in eastern Syria’s Latakia Governorate until his location came under attack from opposition forces’ drones. Assad insisted that he left the country with Russia’s assistance only when the threat from “terrorist forces” became overwhelming.
On 15 December, Russia’s military withdrew its military from northern Syria’s Manbij and Kobani regions. The decision followed a fresh offensive by the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) against the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
On the same day, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that his government planned to double the Israeli population in the Golan Heights region by establishing settlements, citing the need to insulate the region from Syrian threats. Netanyahu stated that while Israel had “no interest in Syria,” his government intended to “thwart the potential threats from Syria and to prevent the takeover of terrorist elements near our border.”
On 14 December, Turkey reopened its embassy in Damascus. Ankara closed the embassy in 2012, citing mounting insecurities amidst the ongoing Syrian Civil War. On 13 December, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, met US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, stressing their shared “imperative” to “ensure the elimination of the territorial caliphate of ISIS.” Additionally, Fidan raised Turkey’s conflict with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), connecting the latter with the need to “prevent terrorism from gaining ground.”
On 12 December, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, blamed the US, Israel and Turkey for Assad’s defeat, branding the opposition groups as “aggressors.” Khamenei predicted that “resistance” would spread in the region, and “By God’s blessing, the territories occupied in Syria will be freed by the brave young people of Syria.”
Issues at large
First, the fall of Assad regime. Although former President Bashar al-Assad claimed his government to be the sole sovereign of Syria, much of the country has been controlled by various armed groups since the civil war began in 2011. Between 27 November and 10 December, anti-Assad armed groups, led by Al-Qaeda and ISIS offshoot called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), launched a fresh offensive against the government. Based on northwestern Syria’s Idlib city, HTS captured the SAA strongholds of Aleppo, Hama and Homs within two weeks, finally establishing an interim Syrian Salvation Government in Damascus on 10 December. According to the Institute for the Study of War, HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara is consolidating political and military power by integrating non-HTS armed groups into the interim government and securing control over the Assad government’s civilian and military institutions. For Jolani, with governance in hand, the HTS-led regime would have the legitimacy to exercise force and its armed force would be institutionalised under the Ministry of Defence. Other groups must disarm or cooperate with the government. Additionally, Syria’s relations with the international community shall be normalised, and sanctions imposed during Assad’s rule should be removed by political and diplomatic outreach to the West.
Second, Turkey, the US and the SNA-SDF conflict. In 2011, Turkey began training and arming the Syrian National Army (then called the Free Syrian Army) to counter the Kurdish-dominated, US-backed People’s Protection Units (which became the SDF in 2015) and overthrow Assad’s government. The SDF, with its local espionage capabilities, was crucial in Washington’s war against ISIS in Syria. Turkey wants to destroy the SDF and create buffer zones along the Syrian border. After Assad’s ouster, the SNA, backed by Turkey’s air force, launched a fresh offensive against the SDF strongholds in Manbij, al-Bab, and Tel Rifaat. The withdrawal of the anti-SNA Russian military further disadvantaged the SDF. So far, the US and Turkey have managed the SNA-SDF conflict diplomatically. While the US reached an informal agreement with Turkey to facilitate SDF fighters’ exit from Manbij, Ankara continues to justify its support for the SNA by categorising the PKK with ISIS and framing its anti-SDF operations as anti-terrorism.
Third, the Russia and Iran factors. Although Moscow arranged Assad’s safe exit from Damascus, the status of Russia’s naval base in Tartarus, air base in Khmeimim, and installations across formerly government-controlled regions remains uncertain. Moscow’s outreach to the HTS aims to retain its military presence. Additionally, Iran supported Assad by deploying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria and providing his government with military and intelligence advisors. Although Iran-backed Hezbollah was active in supporting Assad during the civil war, both of them were engaged in military confrontation with Israel when HTS launched its offensive, making them unable to assist the Assad government.
Fourth, Israel and the Golan Heights. For Israel, Assad’s Syria was an Iranian proxy facilitating arms transfer from Iran to Hezbollah. Additionally, Israel believes that Syria might resume its anti-Israel role which must be met with pre-emptive military action. Israel exploited the power vacuum of Assad’s removal, destroying the SAA’s air force and naval capabilities in over 350 airstrikes. Additionally, Israel’s military occupied the Golan Heights buffer zone and stationed its troops on Mount Hermon on the Syria-Lebanon border, further entrenching its control over the contested region. Although al-Jolani stated that Israel used Assad’s removal for its self-interest, he wanted to focus on rebuilding the country and would avoid starting new conflicts, indicating that he tacitly accepted Israel’s increased presence.
In perspective
The HTS victory marked a watershed moment in Syria’s long-drawn civil war, with an alternative government being installed in Damascus after 13 years of fighting. With Assad’s primary backers, Iran (with Hezbollah) and Russia, preoccupied with other conflicts, HTS’ well-timed offensive overthrew over 50 years of Assad family rule. Although Jolani promises to govern through institutions, he has not clarified the rules and norms that his new institutions will implement. Therefore, Jolani’s international messaging may turn out to be the institutionalisation of Political Islam. Beginning in 2010, the Syrian conflict escalated rapidly from civic protest against authoritarianism to civil war before reaching its present form as a battleground of multiple state and non-state actors. HTS’ takeover has emboldened Israel and Turkey, who have exploited that opportunity to fulfil political and territorial ambitions. With Iran’s regional presence weakened, Israel’s assertive posture against the “Axis of Resistance” can be expected to continue.